Strider Report Reveals Unsanctioned Firms Supplying Iran’s Drone Program
Research details the role of intermediary networks and dual-use components in enabling the Islamic Republic’s drone production despite international sanctions
Salt Lake City, UT (March 31, 2026) – Strider Technologies, Inc. (“Strider”), the leading provider of strategic intelligence, today published a new report examining how Iran has sustained and scaled its drone program through the systematic use of global commercial supply chains.
Strider’s report—Iran’s Drone Program: How the Islamic Republic Exploited Commercial Supply Chains to Reshape Modern Warfare—provides a detailed analysis of how Iranian entities leverage front companies, intermediaries, and dual-use technologies sourced from international markets to maintain drone production and distribution.
Iran’s drone program has become a central feature of modern conflict, with systems such as the Shahed-136 deployed across multiple theaters, including Ukraine and the Middle East. Strider’s research shows that, despite extensive international sanctions, Iran continues to access critical components through complex procurement networks that operate across multiple jurisdictions.
A central case study in the report examines Pars Aero Institute Kerman, an Iranian drone supplier with documented ties to the country’s military ecosystem. Strider identified relationships between Pars Aero and suppliers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong, including companies that are partners of U.S.-sanctioned entities for ties to the People’s Liberation Army. As of the report’s publication, the entities detailed in Strider’s report—Pars Aero, Foxtech Hobby Co. Ltd., and Huixinghai Technology (Tianjin) Co. Ltd.—were not found on any U.S. or allied sanctioned lists.
“For companies, the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict is transforming scenarios once treated as contingencies into operational risks that require active mitigation,” said Greg Levesque, CEO and Co-Founder of Strider. “Strider’s latest research illuminates how Iran has sustained and scaled its drone program through the systematic use of global commercial supply chains. Simply complying with sanctions does not eliminate exposure to risk through indirect relationships embedded deep within supply chains. For business leaders, understanding how products, components, and partnerships may intersect with state-sponsored threat environments is essential to making quick, confident decisions in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.”
The report also details how the mix of domestic assembly and foreign sourcing helps Iran sustain production, replace restricted parts, and scale exports to partners and proxies despite sanctions pressure. Oftentimes, the path from a foreign manufacturer to an Iranian assembly line runs through a deliberately constructed network. In a submission to G7 governments in 2023, Ukraine identified the primary transshipment corridor for these components as Turkey, India, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Costa Rica, with the UAE also emerging as a particularly significant re-export hub. Components move through this corridor via front companies and commercial channels designed to obfuscate their origin and end use.
The full Iran’s Drone Program: How the Islamic Republic Exploited Commercial Supply Chains to Reshape Modern Warfare report can be found here.
About Strider
Strider is the leading strategic intelligence company empowering organizations to secure and advance their technology and innovation. Leveraging cutting-edge AI technology alongside proprietary methodologies, Strider transforms publicly available data into critical insights. This strategic intelligence enables organizations to proactively address and respond to risks associated with state-sponsored intellectual property theft, targeted talent acquisition, and third-party partners. Strider has operations in 16 countries around the globe with offices in Salt Lake City, UT; Washington, DC; London; Tokyo; and Sydney.
